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Since John Taylor (1993) estimated the Federal Reserve monetary policy 
rule, there has been an increasing interest in building the model and the expla-
nation of the efficiency of “active monetary policy rules”, that is a police that 
respond to an increase in inflation more that one-to-one increase in nominal 
interest rate. The basic idea is that in order to get a unique stable solution, poli-
cymakers should use active monetary policy taking into account current infla-
tion (Kerr and King, 1996) or future inflation expectations (Bernanke and 
Woodford, 1997; Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000). 
The empirical confirmation was recently got in the paper Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler (2000). Authors estimate monetary policy rules in the US for the dif-
ferent periods of time and show that in the US monetary policy was passive 
during Pre-Volker period (1960–1979) and became active during Volcker-Green-
span period (1979–1996), arguing that active monetary policy rule gave much 
better results in stabilizing the economy. 
The equilibrium determinacy under active monetary policy rules is showed 
in Kerr and King (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), Christiano and 
Gust (1999). But there are papers arguing that such policy cannot be sustain-
able. 
In recent papers (especially, Duport, 2001; Carlstrom and Fuerts, 2005; 
Kurozumi and Zandweghe, 2007; and Benhabib and Eusepi, 2005; Sveen and 
Weinke, 2005; Kurozumi, 2006; Huang, Meng, 2007; Xiao, 2008) it is shown 
that in the presence of price stickiness, investment and capital accumulation 
activity, active monetary policy rules can lead to indeterminacy under various 
assumptions about the structure of the economy. In contrast to previous mod-
els, where the interest rate affects output only thought the consumption and 
saving decision of the household, in these papers investment decision of the firm 
is added. And that is the crucial assumption that changes the stability structure 
of the model and makes indeterminacy likely to occur. 
In seminal paper Duport (2001) builds a continuous-time model with a 
quadratic nominal price adjustment cost and endogenous capital accumula-
1  The authors would like to thank Oleg Zamulin (New Economic School) and Dmitriy Sto-
lyarov (University of Michigan) for valuable comments and suggestions.
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tion. The author implies monetary policy only as a function of inflation and 
shows that the dynamics of the model demonstrates sunspot-equlibria under 
active monetary policy. The key channel of the indeterminacy is in the endog-
enous capital accumulation, especially in the no-arbitrage condition between 
the real return on bonds and the real return on capital. This implies that capi-
tal rental rate increases when monetary policy responds by increasing real in-
terest rate to higher inflation, increasing the cost of renting capital and leading 
to cost-push inflation. So that inflation expectations become self-fulfilled. 
The idea of endogenous capital accumulation gave birth to large academic 
research on whether interest rate rules may lead to local real indeterminacy of 
equilibrium. Carlstrom and Fuerts (2005) construct a discrete-time version of 
Duport`s (2001) model and analyze necessary conditions for local indetermi-
nacy under current-looking and forward-looking monetary policy rules only 
with respect to inflation, but not output. In endogenous capital accumulation 
environment real indeterminacy is very likely to occur, and in particular, they 
show that all forward-looking interest rate rules are subject to indeterminacy. 
Kurozumi and Zandweghe (2007) modify Carlstrom and Fuerts (2005) mo-
del by introducing more complicated MP rule that responds also to output and 
contains interest rate smoothing. They show that nominal indeterminacy con-
ditions are sufficiently dependent on the model calibration parameters, and 
sunspot equilibria is less likely to occur as long as the policy response to ex-
pected future inflation is sufficiently strong. 
Kurozumi (2006) provides the indeterminacy analysis using different tim-
ings of money balances of the utility function. Huang, Meng (2007) add quad-
ratic price adjustment cost to the utility function and show capital accumula-
tion activity leads to macroeconomic instability. Xiao (2007) analyses indeter-
minacy conditions under increasing returns to scale. King and Wolman (2004) 
construct the model with dynamic complementarity between forward-looking 
private agents and a discretionary monetary authority and show how discre-
tionary monetary policy can lead to multiple equilibria. Benhabib, Eusepi (2005) 
and Sveen, Weinke (2005) analyze the influence of including capital into the 
model on the firm’s pricing decisions thought the cost channel.
In the case of indeterminacy one can not exactly construct predictable mone-
tary policy due to the fact that the economy is driven by the sunspot-shocks, and 
each trajectory converges to steady-state. Is this again a “peril of Taylor rules”? 
Was the Volcker-Greenspan-Bernanke monetary policy driven by the stochastic 
shocks? This is key questions and the field our paper contributes to.
Neither Duport`s (2001), Carlstrom and Fuerts (2005) nor most recent pa-
pers do not introduce current or future expected output to MP rule and provide 
the real indeterminacy analysis and policy implications. We show that these 
conditions are quite significant. 
We calibrate the standard version of Carlstrom and Fuerts (2005) model. 
The key difference is that we add response to output to the monetary policy 
rule. In contrast to Kurozumi and Zandweghe (2007) we analyze not nominal, 
but real indeterminacy conditions. Also we found that the calibration of mo-
del in Kurozumi and Zandweghe (2007) is inconsistent because of the incor-
rectly defined steady state shares of consumption and investment in output. In 
our paper we correct this problem and show that adding Current or Expected 
Output to MP rule substantially changes the conditions for real indeterminacy 
to occur. 
In contrast to some existing research we show that under current-looking 
with respect to output MP rule real indeterminacy is almost not likely to occur 
under passive or active MP; under forward-looking with respect to output MP 
rule real indeterminacy is not likely to occur under active and likely to occur 
under passive MP rules.
We also show that monetary policy that takes into account output usually 
leads to nominal indeterminacy: situation at which the inflation rate is always 
indetermined. In this case monetary policy seems rather ineffective.
 So, we provide the next step of our analysis: the nominal determinacy con-
ditions that lead the economy to unique inflation rates. We show that active 
monetary policy that takes into account current output leads to nominal deter-
minacy; under forward-looking monetary policy rules with respect to output 
nominal determinacy is impossible. The normative result is that active and for-
ward-looking MP rules with respect to output give better results in stabilizing 
the economy.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briefly discuss the 
sticky price model with capital accumulation in discrete time (as in Carlstrom 
and Fuerts (2005)) and construct monetary policy rule with interest rate smooth-
ing and response to output. In Section 3 we analyze the dynamic properties of 
the log-linearized around the steady-state model. In Section 4 we provide the 
real indeterminacy analysis for current and forward-looking monetary policy 
rules with respect to output. In Section 5 we provide the analysis of nominal 
determinacy conditions and the efficiency of monetary policy. In Section 5 we 
conclude.
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2. the Model
We follow Yun (1998), Carlstrom and Fuerts (2005) and construct the mo-
del of general equilibrium with sticky prices in discrete time. We also introduce 
monetary policy rule as in Kurozumi and Zandweghe (2007).
2.1. Households 
The economy consist of large number of households, those seek to maxi-
mize their life-time utility function:
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At the beginning of each period t household have 
 
M
t
cash balances and 
 
B
t −1
 
nominal bonds. Household starts the period t by trading bonds and receiving a 
lump-sum monetary transfer 
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2  As in recent papers we introduce end-of-period money holdings to be consistent with Du-
por’s continuous-time analysis (for discussion see Carlstrom, Fuerst (2005)).
money on capital in the new period 
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C
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rent prices
 
P
t
.
Later we introduce utility function linear by labor (by putting χ = 0) and 
analyze the case of infinite labor supply elasticity33.
The first order conditions for the household’s maximization problem are 
the following:
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Equation (4) is standard consumption-labor optimal choice with respect to 
their prices. Equation (5) is Euler equation of consumption dynamics. Equa-
tion (6) is the Fisher equation that connects inflation and interest rates. Equa-
tion (7) is the money demand. 
2.2. Firms
Firms are monopolistic competitors in the intermediate good market. The 
final output 
 
Y
t
 is produced from intermediate goods 
 
y
t
(i)  by Dixit-Stiglitz 
(1977) technology:
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The corresponding demand for intermediate good possesses constant price 
elasticity η :
3  Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000, 2001) show that the indeterminacy conditions are independ-
ent of labor supply elasticity.
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where 
 
P
t
(i)  is the price of intermediate good and 
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is the price of final 
good.
Production function of each firm exhibits constant returns to scale:
 f (K ,L) = K
αL1−α  (10)
The first order conditions for cost minimization problem are: 
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 is the marginal costs of production.
Taking into account the Cobb-Douglas production function (10), the FOC`s 
take the form:
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We use Calvo (1983) staggered pricing model at the economy level. Each 
period fraction  (1 − ν) of firms gets a signal to set a new price. So, each firm 
maximizes the sum of discounted profits taking into account the probability of 
changing its price. The optimizations problem of such firm takes the form:
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The profit maximization conditions give a New Keynesian Phillips Curve 
(see Galf, Gertler (1998) and Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1999) for details), which 
is discussed later.
2.3. Monetary policy rule
According to the empirical estimates of Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1999) we 
assume that the monetary policy should react to inflation and output using in-
terest rate smoothing. We follow Kurozumi and Zandweghe (2007) and use a 
generalized version of a monetary policy rule:
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where  R, π, Y are the steady state values of the interest rate, inflation and out-
put. ϕ
π
and 
 
ϕ
Y
 are elasticity parameters of the interest rate with respect to the 
expected inflation and output correspondingly. By introducing j = 0 we get 
current-looking MP rule with respect to output; and j = 1 — forward-looking 
MP rule with respect to output. We also use interest rate smoothing with weights 
 
ϕ
R
 and 
 
(1 − ϕ
R
)  to previous period interest rate and response to inflation and 
output correspondingly. If we use 
 
ϕ
R
= 0  and 
 
ϕ
π
= 0  we get standard Carl-
strom and Fuerst (2005) model in discrete time, and the analog of continuous 
time Duport`s (2001) model. 
We say that monetary policy rule is active, if the nominal interest rate in-
creases more that one-to-one with inflation (
 
ϕ
π
> 1 ), otherwise we call it pas-
sive. 
Money supply is endogenous in this model and as in recent papers we as-
sume that Ricardian equivalence holds. So we do not analyze the hidden go-
vernment budget constraint and the equation for the evolution of government 
debt. Indeterminacy analysis for non-Ricardian fiscal policy is presented at 
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe (2001a).
3. dynamics of the model
The dynamics of the model is presented by the system of the log-linearized 
FOCs for households, firms and the monetary policy rule around the steady-
state:
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Equation (17) is the Euler equation for households’ dynamic optimization 
problem. Equation (18) is the Fisher relation between the nominal interest rate, 
expected future and real interest rate, where the last is determined in the pro-
duction sector. Equation (19) is the wage-equilibrium relation of the log-line-
arized equation (4) and (14). Equation (20) is the capital accumulation rela-
tion with depreciation rate δ . Equation (21) is the division of the output be-
tween consumption and investment with shares in output 
 
s
C
,s
I
 correspond-
ingly dependent on the parameters of the model and calculated at the 
steady-state. Equation (22) is New Keynesian Phillips Curve derived from Cal-
vo (1983) staggered-pricing model, where 
 
λ = (1 − υ)(1 − βυ)
υ
 is the real mar-
ginal elasticity of inflation. Equation (23) is the log-linearized monetary poli-
cy rule (16).
4. indeterminacy analysis
In this part of the paper we provide the indeterminacy analysis for the cur-
rent- and forward-looking monetary policy rules with respect to output.
Equations (17)—(23) are the first-order dynamic system of equations. The 
variables 
 
π
t
 
 
C
t
 
 
Y
t
 are non-predetermined, and 
 
K
t
 
 
R
t −1
 are predetermined. 
According to Blanchard-Kahn (1980) conditions we get indeterminacy if the 
number of stable roots (eigenvalues of the matrix of the system which are less 
than one) is more than two in our case (number of predetermined variables). 
In this case we get a nominal indeterminacy as inflation rate is still indetermined, 
simply because there exists an infinite number of initial price levels consistent 
with a perfect-foresight equilibrium.
We are interested in a real indeterminacy, situation in which the behavior of 
one or more real variables is not pinned down by the model and leads to mul-
tiple (sunspot) equilibria4. In order to get real indeterminacy we need one more 
stable root in addition to Blanchard-Kahn (1980) conditions. 
In our case equations (17)—(23) represent the system for five variables, the 
three of them are non-predetermined, and two are predetermined. 
The stability conditions are as follows:
In the case of two stable roots (out of five possible) we get nominal de-1. 
terminacy;
In the case of three stable roots we get nominal indeterminacy;2. 
In the case of four or five stable roots we get real indeterminacy.3. 
Interest rate smoothing leads to the case that variable 
 
R
t −1
 is predetermined. 
As 
 
R
t −1
 appears only in the MP rule equation, it always leads to additional sta-
ble root in the system. Interest rate smoothing assumption does not influence 
the stability conditions. So, during numerical simulations we simply use 
 
ϕ
R
= 0. 
We are mainly interested in the elasticities of interest rate with respect to 
expected inflation (ϕ
π
) and output (
 
ϕ
Y
) in the intervals 
 
ϕ
π
= [0.5;  2.5]  and
 
ϕ
Y
= [0.2;  0.7] 5.
We analyze the stability of the model under the baseline calibration used in 
recent papers (Table 1). 
Table 1. Baseline calibration of the model
Parameters of the model Calibration value
β Discount factor 0.99
 1 − ν Fraction of firms that get a signal to set a new price 0.477
α Capital share 1/3
ψ Degree of non-separability of utility function between 
consumption and real balances
1
δ Depreciation rate of capital 0,02
 
ϕ
R
Interest rate smoothing parameter 0
4  The detailed analysis of conditions for nominal and real indeterminacy is presented in Ben-
habib, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe (2001a).
5 According to simple Taylor rule and empirical estimates of Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
(2000).
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Parameters of the model Calibration value
ϕ
π
Elasticity of interest rate with respect to expected 
inflation
0.5
 
ϕ
Y
Elasticity of interest rate with respect to output 1.5
 
P
z
= η
η −1
Steady state markup 1.1
χ Inverse labor supply elasticity 0
4.1. Current-looking monetary policy rule with respect to output
Under various calibrations of the model we analyze the conditions for the 
real indeterminacy to occur. Under current-looking monetary policy rule with 
respect to output the monetary policy rule takes the form:
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Under baseline calibration we show that real indeterminacy is almost im-
possible (Fig. 1A) if monetary policy reacts to output deviations. There is only 
a small area of indeterminacy region under active monetary policy and very 
small (even zero) response to output. This result is very similar to Duport (2001), 
Carlstrom and Fuerts (2005) who used monetary policy rule without response 
to output. But the addition of response to output to MP rule leads to real de-
terminacy in contrast to the results of recent papers.
We also analyze the robustness of our results by using different calibrations 
for the discount factor, capital share, fraction of firms that get a signal to set a 
new price, depreciation rate of capital.
Changes in the discount factor ( β) and the depreciation rate of capital ( δ)
dramatically increase the real indeterminacy area (Fig. 1B(i) and 1B(ii)). This 
result is quite predictable: it is due to cost channel of inflation — the main chan-
nel of indeterminacy in recent papers — investment activity in the standard 
sticky price models. 
Changes in fraction of firms that get a signal to set a new price ( 1 − ν) de-
creases the indeterminacy area (Fig. 1C(i) and 1C(ii)). When prices are almost 
flexible ( 1 − ν = 0.9) there is almost no real indeterminacy regions in the 
model.
Our model shows that real indeterminacy regions are almost not sensitive 
to changes in capital share ( α) and the equilibrium markup (
 
η
η−1
). A related 
paper by Huang and Meng (2007) has the opposite finding, perhaps, due to 
different assumptions about the price-adjustment process. 
A. Baseline calibration
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Fig. 1. Real Indeterminacy regions (shaded area)  
under current-looking monetary policy rules with respect to output
Table 1
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4.2. Forward-looking monetary policy rule with respect to output
Under forward-looking monetary policy rule with respect to output the 
monetary policy rule takes the form:
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Under baseline calibration we show that real indeterminacy is almost im-
possible under active monetary policy rules; and there is a large indeterminacy 
region under passive monetary policy rules (Fig. 2A). This result is opposite to 
the results of the basic models with investment (Duport (2001), Carlstrom and 
Fuerts (2005) and others) that do not tale into account a response to future 
output. 
Under very small response of monetary policy to output real indetermina-
cy is possible under active monetary policy rules and not possible under passive 
(Fig. 2A). But the results change dramatically if the response to future output 
in monetary policy rule increases: indeterminacy becomes almost impossible 
under active monetary policy rules and very possible under passive. So, the 
main results of recent papers are mainly based on small indeterminacy region 
under active monetary policy rules and very small response to output. 
Changes in the discount factor ( β) and the depreciation rate of capital ( δ)
substantially influence the real indeterminacy area (Fig. 2B(i) and 2B(ii)). This 
cost channel of inflation leads to additional indeterminacy area under active 
monetary policy due to dramatic increase of equilibrium interest rate in the 
economy. 
Changes in the fraction of firms that get a signal to set a new price ( 1 − ν)
decreases the indeterminacy area (Fig. 2C(i) and 2C(ii)). When prices are al-
most flexible ( 1 − ν = 0.9) there is almost no real indeterminacy in the 
model. 
Our model shows that real indeterminacy regions are very small sensitive 
to changes in the capital share ( α) and the equilibrium markup (
 
η
η−1
) under 
forward-looking monetary policy rule with respect to output. This result is op-
posite to the result of Huang, Meng (2007).
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5. nominal determinacy analysis
In our paper we analyze the conditions for real indeterminacy to occur in 
the model with capital accumulation. The key assumption is that we add re-
sponse to output into the monetary policy rule. In the case of real indetermi-
nacy, nominal indeterminacy always exists. In this case neither inflation nor 
price level can be determined. The result seems to be quite counterintuitive, 
but under nominal and real indeterminacy models with monetary policy rules 
do not determine inflation rates definitely.
In this part of our paper we analyze the conditions not for real, but even for 
nominal determinacy to occur so that inflation rates to be definitely determined. 
Only in this case monetary policy gives good results in stabilizing inflation 
rates.
As it was mentioned before equations (17)–(23) are the first-order dynam-
ic system of five equations and the stability conditions are as follows:
In the case of two stable roots (out of five possible) we get nominal de-1. 
terminacy;
In the case of three stable roots we get nominal indeterminacy;2. 
In the case of four or five stable roots we get real indeterminacy.3. 
5.1. Nominal Determinacy Analysis under Current-looking  
monetary policy rule with respect to output
Under baseline calibration we show that nominal determinacy is possible 
under active and even small response to output monetary policy rules; under 
passive monetary policy rules nominal determinacy is impossible (Fig. 3). 
Changes in the discount factor ( β) and the depreciation rate of capital ( δ)
influence the nominal determinacy area such that under passive monetary pol-
icy rules and high response to output nominal determinacy become possible 
(Fig. 3B(i) and 3B(ii)). 
When prices are almost flexible the rage of parameters for nominal deter-
minacy to occur becomes much smaller (Fig. 3C(i) and 3C(ii)).
5.2. Nominal Determinacy Analysis under Forward-looking  
monetary policy rule with respect to output
Under forward-looking monetary policy rules with respect to output nom-
inal determinacy is almost impossible (Fig. 4). Even significant changed in dis-
count factor ( β) and depreciation rate of capital ( δ) do not substantially in-
crease nominal determinacy areas (Fig. 3B(i) and 3B(ii)). Flexibility of prices 
and other parameters do not have substantial influence on the determinacy ar-
eas (Fig. 3C(i) and 3C(ii)).
5.3. Nominal Determinacy Analysis: main results
We show that under capital accumulation monetary policy that takes into 
account expected future output can not lead economy to unique inflation rates 
under realistic calibration of the model: inflation rates are always indeter-
mined.
But active monetary policy with response to current output leads to nomi-
nal determinacy. If output is not taken into account the result are quite oppo-
site: even real indeterminacy is possible (as in Duport (2001), Carlstrom and 
Fuerts (2005)). 
The normative result is that active and forward-looking monetary policy 
rules with respect to output give better results in stabilizing the inflation.
6. concluding remarks
We analyze the conditions for real indeterminacy to occur in the models 
with capital accumulation. The key assumption is that we add response to out-
put into the monetary policy rule. In our paper we show that adding Current 
or Expected Output to the MP rule substantially changes the conditions for 
real indeterminacy to occur. We also provide the nominal determinacy analysis 
and show that active and forward-looking monetary policy rule with respect to 
output give better results in stabilizing the economy.
In contrast to some existing research we show that:
Under Current-looking with respect to output MP rule1.  
Real indeterminacy is almost not likely to occur under passive or ac-a. 
tive MP rules;
Real indeterminacy areas are almost not sensitive to changes in the b. 
markup and the share of capital in output;
Real indeterminacy areas are very sensitive to changes in the discount c. 
and depreciation rates;
Under more flexible prices real indeterminacy is less likely to oc-d. 
cur;
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Under Forward-looking with respect to output MP rule 2. 
Real indeterminacy is not likely to occur under active and likely to a. 
occur under passive MP rules;
Real indeterminacy areas are almost not sensitive to the markup chang-b. 
es and the share of capital in output;
Real indeterminacy areas are very sensitive to changes in the discount c. 
and depreciation rates;
Under more flexible prices real indeterminacy is less likely to oc-d. 
cur;
Active MP rules that take into account current output usually leads to nom-3. 
inal determinacy; 
Under forward-looking MP rules with respect to output nominal indetermi-4. 
nacy is impossible.
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